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Introduction
In , the United Nations proclaimed March  theInternational Day for the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination, to commemorate the events of
March , , when South African police opened fire
and killed sixty-nine people at a peaceful demonstration
against the apartheid “pass laws” in Sharpeville, South Af-
rica. This year, the United Nations used observance of the
International Day to focus attention on the upcoming
World Conference on Racism, Xenophobia, and Related
Intolerance, to be hosted by South Africa in . High on
the agenda was the growing concern over the level of xe-
nophobia and increased violence toward those perceived
as “foreigners” in South Africa within the past several
years. The end of apartheid, though a stunning victory
for human rights and democracy, has not translated into
the expected end to racial discrimination in South Africa.
Why has the transition from apartheid to the “Rainbow
Nation” envisioned by Archbishop Desmond Tutu proven
fertile ground for xenophobia? The answer can be found
in an understanding of the process of nation building
and national identity construction. At the same time that
South Africa actively seeks to promote itself as a liberal
democratic state and to foster ties to the African conti-
nent, its efforts to construct its own sense of national
identity have led to the exclusion of and the denial of
rights to those perceived as “foreigners.”
The preamble of South Africa’s constitution envisions
a “society based on democratic values, social justice, and
fundamental human rights.”1 In the years since the his-
toric all-race democratic elections of , South Africa
has embarked on a fervent—and in many ways vision-
ary—restructuring of its policies toward immigration
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and asylum. In an attempt to rid itself of its apartheid
legacy, the new government, in , acceded to the 
 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refu-
gee Problems in Africa and, in , to the   Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
Protocol. Although the universal human rights enshrined
in these international documents were reinforced by the
Government of National Unity’s amendments to South
African domestic law, the reality of immigration and asy-
lum in South Africa has proven to be far less enlightened
than the rhetoric. Despite the new legal rights afforded to
non-citizens within South Africa, the “exclusion policies”
established under apartheid continue to be enforced. As
the government and the people of South Africa strive to
define who is a citizen, the convenient solution has been
to focus on who is not. Examining South Africa’s immi-
gration policies in their historical context and incorpo-
rating an understanding of the process of
nation-building, it is evident that the increased levels of
xenophobia among South Africans represent an ever-
widening gap between the country’s attempts to restruc-
ture itself constitutionally (by altering its laws) and
culturally (by changing the people’s perception of what it
means to be South African).
The Importance of Migrants to South Africa
From the time of its creation as a state, South Africa has
relied heavily upon, and been defined by, the migration
of populations across its borders. Based on census figures,
South Africa’s foreign-born population has always been
significant, and it increased steadily during the twentieth
century. For a multiplicity of reasons, African migrants
have traditionally flocked to South Africa, attracted by
the employment opportunities within South Africa, and
driven from neighbouring countries by political and eco-
nomic instability.
Over the past  years, large-scale migration into
South Africa has been fuelled by the mining industry’s
need for unskilled and semi-skilled “contract labour.”
Tracing the carving up of Africa between the colonial
powers to the  Berlin Conference, Kotzé and Hill as-
sert that, in southern Africa, political boundaries failed to
coincide with economic boundaries. As a result, large
numbers of migrants from neighbouring states recruited
to work in South Africa’s mines “played an indispensable
role in building South Africa’s economic infrastructure,
while simultaneously (if unwittingly) contributing to the
economic decline of their countries of origin.”
Historically, foreigners have accounted for at least 
per cent, and at times up to  per cent, of those em-
ployed as mine workers in South Africa. According to
Wilson and Ramphele, “Nowhere else in the world has an
industrial economy employed for so long such a high
proportion of oscillating migrants (coming from both in-
side and outside the country) in its labour force.” One of
the reasons that South Africa’s mining industry has con-
sistently been able to attract such a large number of for-
eign workers has been the relative economic inequality
that exists between South Africa and its border countries.
South Africans are reportedly thirty-six times richer, on
average, than Mozambicans—an enormous wealth dis-
parity when compared to the fact that Americans are only
seven times richer than Mexicans.
Equally important as the economic “pull” factors
within South Africa that have attracted foreign workers,
have been the “push” factors—economic and political in-
stability—within neighbouring countries that have
driven people out of those countries and into South Af-
rica. The causes of economic stagnation in South Africa’s
border countries are complex, but an important contrib-
uting factor has been the destabilization campaign waged
by the apartheid state in South Africa during the s.
According to a highly critical report published recently by
Human Rights Watch, the South African government led
by President Pieter Willem Botha launched a campaign
aimed at destroying the educational, transport, and eco-
nomic infrastructure in neighbouring African countries,
in order to punish neighbouring states for supporting the
African National Congress () and its anti-apartheid
movement. South Africa backed the rebel groups 
in Angola and  in Mozambique, and intervened
directly in Lesotho, Botswana, Angola, and Namibia. The
apartheid state also instituted an economic embargo that
was particularly destructive to the landlocked states of
Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana.
As a result of the destabilization campaign during the
apartheid era, South Africa’s Bantustan regions received
large numbers of not only economic migrants, but also
refugees from the countries of the Southern African De-
velopment Community (). The separate and quasi-
independent status of the various “homelands” enabled
them to grant refugee status to hundreds of thousands of
linguistically and culturally affiliated Africans, especially
Mozambicans. Since the dissolution of South Africa’s in-
ternal borders and the incorporation of the homelands
into the South African state, however, the legal status of
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these former refugees has been blurred. As a result, foreign-
born people in South Africa, who were once accepted in
the homelands, increasingly find themselves the targets of
anti-immigrant sentiment, often resulting in violence.
While the new government has attempted to rectify this
through a series of amnesties granting permanent resi-
dence to miners and members of  countries resident
in South Africa for a specified period of time, countless
Africans remain in South Africa without formal status.
 The History of Migration Policy in South Africa
prior to 
In order to understand the challenges that South Africa
currently faces in determining citizenship rights for those
within its borders and for those wishing to immigrate, it
is necessary to view the present situation in the context of
the policies that were developed to control migration
prior to, and as part of, the apartheid regime of the twen-
tieth century. As early as , three years after the estab-
lishment of the Union, immigration legislation sought to
restrict black mobility within South Africa. The Immi-
gration Regulations Act of , South Africa’s first na-
tionwide immigration legislation, established an
Immigration Board with the power to prohibit the entry
of “any person or class of persons deemed by the Minister
on economic grounds or on account of standards or hab-
its of life to be unsuited to the requirements of the
Union.” Subsequent immigration legislation, such as the
 Aliens Act, designed to restrict Jewish immigration
by requiring work permits for non-citizens, paved the
way for the apartheid policies enacted after .
During the apartheid era, the government attempted
to control the movement of non-whites within South Af-
rica through the establishment of the influx control sys-
tem. All Africans who travelled outside of the Bantustans
were required to have a pass, and inability to produce the
pass on request was cause for immediate arrest and de-
portation. The pass laws, which were finally removed in
, resulted in over , Africans being arrested in
the year –, at the height of their use, and in over 
million arrests over the period from  to . Refer-
ring to the creation of the Bantustan policy, Kotzé and
Hill argue that “the domestic result of this economic re-
structuring was the creation of massive rural settlements
of South Africans in refugee-like conditions but robbed
of official refugee status under the emerging international
refugee regime by the fiction of separate development.”
While the system of “separate but equal” never gained
any real international legitimacy, it allowed South Africa
to maintain an image of itself as an immigration state. At
the same time that South Africa sought to restrict black
migration and other classes of “prohibited persons” from
entering, it openly encouraged white immigration from
Germany, Holland, and Britain. During the s, white
Nigerians and Angolans fleeing the collapse of colonial-
ism were offered asylum in South Africa. While the si-
multaneous policies of immigration (primarily white)
and exclusion (primarily black) were at odds with one
another, they were, in fact, not all that different from the
practices of other colonial-settler states. Both the United
States, through its National Origins Act, and Australia,
through the White Australia policy, sought to control the ra-
cial composition of the populations within their territories.
The legacy of the apartheid period and the immigra-
tion policies that shaped it are still very evident in the is-
sues facing South Africa today. The  Aliens Control
Act, still in effect today, is merely a consolidation of pre-
vious acts entrenched in the racism and anti-Semitism of
the s. Adopted by the previous administration but
amended during the course of the transition to democ-
racy, the Aliens Control Act continues to distinguish be-
tween white migrants and black migrants, and extends
the power of immigration officers to decide immigration
claims, while removing the applicants’ rights to appeal
their decisions. While the government has worked to en-
act new immigration legislation and has even invited
opinions and comments on its green and white papers,
the sections of the Aliens Control Act relating to refugees
were replaced only this year by the new Refugees Act of
, and the draft white paper on International Migra-
tion has yet to be adopted as law.
The Rise of Xenophobia
While many predicted that the end of apartheid would
set in motion the machinery necessary to eliminate racial
discrimination in South Africa, the years since  have
witnessed a dramatic increase in xenophobia and acts of
hostility toward those perceived as “foreigners.” Despite
the adoption of numerous international conventions,
and despite the human rights claims made in the South
African Constitution and the new Refugees Act, newspa-
per headlines attest to the increased violence and negative
attitudes toward immigrants, on the part of both govern-
ment officials and South African citizens. In , a Na-
tional Plan of Action, called Roll Back Xenophobia, was
drafted, encouraging various sectors of society, including
government, to get involved in activities to combat xeno-
phobia. The plan, published jointly by the South African
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Human Rights Commission, the National Consortium
on Refugee Affairs, the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, defined xenophobia as a “deep dislike
of non-nationals by nationals.”
An extensive national survey conducted in mid-
by the Southern African Migration Project examining
South Africans’ attitudes toward immigrants and immi-
gration policy found that  per cent of South Africans
favoured a complete ban on immigration and  per cent
supported strict limits on the numbers of immigrants
permitted to enter the country. Only  per cent indicated
openness toward a more flexible policy that would be tied
to the availability of jobs, and only  per cent supported a
totally open policy of immigration. According to the sur-
vey, the figures represented the highest level of opposi-
tion to immigration recorded by any country in the
world where comparable questions have been asked. Re-
spondents cited job loss, crime, and disease as the nega-
tive consequences they feared from immigrants living in
the country, though only  per cent recorded interacting
on a regular basis with non-citizens in the region.
Although many South Africans are reluctant to admit
that the scores of anti-immigrant abuses reported by hu-
man rights groups in recent years are motivated by xeno-
phobia, it is clear that those perceived as foreigners are
being singled out for abuse. Immigrants are blamed for
crime, drugs, and the high level of unemployment. Any-
one considered “too black” or who is unable to speak a lo-
cal language, such as Xhosa or Zulu, is a potential target.
Police use extremely unreliable indicators such as inocu-
lation scars to identify someone as a foreigner; as a result,
an estimated  per cent of those placed in detention on
suspicion of being undocumented migrants are eventu-
ally released after proving South African citizenship.
Inaccurate representation and “criminalization” of mi-
grants by the media have had a tremendously negative
impact on public opinion toward migrants, especially
when one considers the small minority of South Africans
who report having regular personal contact with non-
citizens. A survey drawing on over  English-language
clippings about migration from South African newspa-
pers between  and  indicated that “coverage of
international migration by the South African press has
been largely anti-immigrant and unanalytical . . . A large
proportion of the articles reproduce racial and national
stereotypes about migrants from other African countries
. . . [which are] made worse by the more subtle use of terms
like ‘illegal’ and ‘alien.’”
The media, however, are not the only source of misin-
formation and inflammatory statements about migrants.
Incendiary comments made by state officials are also con-
tributing to the problem of xenophobia. Minister of
Home Affairs Mangosutho Buthelezi, in his first intro-
ductory speech to Parliament, stated, “If we as South Af-
ricans are going to compete for scarce resources with
millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa,
then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and De-
velopment Program.” In this same speech, Buthelezi
called on local South African communities to assist his
department in curbing the influx of foreigners by report-
ing suspected undocumented migrants. Police have also
been accused of offering monetary rewards to local citizens
in exchange for information about suspected “illegals.”
The role of state officials in promoting anti-immigrant
sentiment among South Africans may, on initial consid-
eration, seem contrary to the state’s professed goal of ra-
cial equality. While it is unlikely that the inflammatory
statements made by Buthelezi and other officials repre-
sent a concerted, state-sponsored attempt to demonize
foreigners, the rise in xenophobia is in fact symptomatic
of the objective to build a “Rainbow Nation” based on the
principle of non-racial citizenship in South Africa. The
explanation of this can be found in an understanding of
what Croucher refers to as the difference between “consti-
tutional engineering” and “cultural engineering.”
Constitutional Engineering since :
Restructuring South African Law
“Constitutionally,” South Africa has made impressive ad-
vances in granting universal human rights to both citi-
zens and non-citizens. In addition to its ratification of the
 Refugee Convention, the  Protocol, and the 
 Conventions mentioned above, South Africa has
signed on to the  Convention against Torture, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Together, these
represent one of the most far-reaching commitments to
the values of universal human rights that a state has ever
undertaken.
The  Constitution draws no distinction between
non-citizens and citizens for most rights, and specifies
thirty rights accorded to all persons in its Bill of Rights.
The rights restricted to citizens are the right to enter the
country, to obtain a passport, to vote, to stand for office,
to form a political party, and to exercise other political
rights. The Constitution guarantees the right of human
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dignity to all individuals and outlines a number of rights
granted to those in detention.
Although many of the rights contained in the Consti-
tution have not yet been interpreted by a court of law, a
unanimous judgment dealing with the rights of non-
citizens found that they “were protected by the Bill of
Rights’ non-discrimination clause, and that all employ-
ment opportunities, with the limited exception of politically
sensitive positions, should be available to permanent resi-
dents and South African citizens on an equal basis.” The
conclusion was that “the treatment of undocumented mi-
grants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and other migrants in
South Africa should be viewed in light of the protections
provided by the Constitution’s Bill of Rights as well as
against international standards.”
Outside the courts, however, the reality of life in South
Africa for migrants is far less egalitarian. As mentioned
above, those perceived as “foreigners” suffer frequent at-
tack and are often scapegoated by the media and by poli-
ticians for the country’s economic difficulties. The end of
apartheid has not led to the expected redistribution of
wealth. Consequently, South Africans who have yet to
“taste the fruits of liberation” have blamed and been in-
cited to blame those whom they perceive as foreigners.
As South Africa struggles to realize its goal of building a
“Rainbow Nation,” the establishment of a non-racial citi-
zenship has translated into an environment of resent-
ment and fear of migrants. Redefining South African
identity in the fledgling democracy has concentrated in-
creasingly on the need to determine who is South African
in opposition to who is not.
Cultural Engineering: Reconstructing Identity and
Nation Building
Though academics debate the precise origins of the mod-
ern nation-state system, most agree that it developed in
Europe and that the concept of national citizenship
emerged as the “natural” joining of identity and rights at
the time of the French Revolution. The state developed as
the protector of citizens—a particular “nation” of people
united by a sense of common purpose, race, language,
etc., and located within a bounded territory. The con-
cepts of nation and territory were integral to the defini-
tion of the nation-state and yet, in practice, combined in
different ways to form various types of states.
In attempting to clarify the complex links that exist be-
tween nation and state, Buzan identifies four models: the
nation-state, the state-nation, the part-nation-state, and
the multination-state, which comprises both the federa-
tive and the imperialist state models. In the first model,
represented by states such as Japan, the nation precedes
the state and is the driving force behind its creation. The
second model, typical of the United States and Australia,
is a top-down model in which the state plays an instru-
mental role in forming the nation. Buzan notes that while
the state-nation model is most easily achieved when the
state occupies a previously uninhabited or sparsely popu-
lated region, it also applies to states that attempt to unify
multiple nations within their boundaries into one cohe-
sive nation. The third model, the part-nation-state, oc-
curs when a nation is divided between and dominant
within two separate states, as was the case with North and
South Vietnam. The multination-state comprises two or
more relatively complete nations within its borders and is
either federative, meaning that the nations exist sepa-
rately and are allowed or even encouraged to pursue their
own identities (exemplified by Canada), or imperialist,
meaning that one nation dominates and controls the oth-
ers (exemplified by the Russians’ control of the former
Soviet states). Not every state falls into one of these cat-
egories, but the models highlight the key links that exist
in the relationship between nation and state.
During the apartheid era, South Africa functioned as
what Buzan refers to in his classification of nation-states
as an imperialist state—one in which one of the nations
within the state (in this case, white South Africa) domi-
nated the state structures to its own advantage. The
South African state drew its sense of national purpose
from ideas of racial preservation, and, as is clear from the
history of South African migration policy outlined above,
immigration and asylum policies were shaped according
to the state’s desire to define citizenship racially.
In , South Africa confronted the immense chal-
lenge of restructuring its concept of nation. Although the
political transition to democracy, marked by the drafting
of the new constitution and the adoption of numerous
international instruments based on human rights, was al-
ready under way, the path toward cultural and social re-
form was not as clearly delineated. In order to rid itself of
the legacy of apartheid, the Government of National
Unity () sought to redefine national identity. The
former imperialist state was faced with the decision either
to adopt a more federative multination-state system in
which racial and ethnic diversity would be respected, or
to pursue a state-nation model by constructing a non-
racial identity that rejected the racial divisiveness of the
past. The problem with the federative model, according
to Croucher, was the potential threat it posed to the sta-
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bility and unity of the state, while the state-nation model
ran the risk of “homogenizing, or not respecting cultural
difference.” Nelson Mandela, by embracing the idea of
the “Rainbow Nation at peace with itself and the world,”
chose to lead South Africa on a path toward the forma-
tion of a state-nation, based on the ideal of non-racial
reconciliation.
Constructing a Non-Racial Nation
The ability to create a sense of nation among a group of
people hinges on the “constructivist” nature of identity
and ethnicity. While a set of common values or character-
istics must exist as a precondition to the formation of a
nation, the concept of ethnic identity upon which it rests
is open to interpretation and manipulation on many lev-
els. “The definition of nation imposes no condition of
permanence, and since both culture and race are mal-
leable qualities, there is no reason why states cannot cre-
ate nations as well as be created by them.”
In applying the “constructivist” approach to the South
African case study, it is evident that, since , the pro-
cess of nation building within South Africa has relied
heavily on both the “primordial” and “instrumental” as-
pects of ethnicity. Under the apartheid state, government
officials invoked race as the defining characteristic in de-
termining ethnicity. While the “primordial” nature of
race is quite evident, it alone was not sufficient to guaran-
tee the success of a policy that used race as the determi-
nant of ethnicity. Even skin colour can blur across the
black/white divide. The success of the apartheid state was
due to its ability to manipulate state structures in support
of its racist campaign.
Since the transition to democracy, the South African
state has actively relied on the “instrumentalist” nature of
ethnicity to redefine South African identity and construct
a new concept of nation. The state has chosen to define
ethnicity non-racially, and instead has focused on pro-
moting national citizenship as the cultural determinant
of South African identity. While many might argue that
such a concept is inclusive of all South Africans, its accep-
tance has, in fact, denied basic rights to a large number of
people within South Africa’s borders and has promoted
an atmosphere of fear and resentment toward a group of
people who, during the apartheid regime, were accepted
within South Africa.
The new concept of national identity has not material-
ized out of nowhere, of course. Certain cultural differ-
ences have always existed between those now considered
South Africans and the foreign-born individuals who
have, increasingly, become the targets of xenophobia. The
“primordial” differences in language and appearance be-
tween South African citizens and non-citizens have al-
ways been present, but have not, until recently, been used
to define membership in the South African nation. For
example, South Africa’s long period of isolation under
apartheid fostered a sense of alienation, shared by both
whites and blacks, from the rest of the continent that is
only now being made relevant. Referring to a recent epi-
sode of xenophobic violence in which  immigrants
from Angola, Namibia, and Nigeria—many of them
longtime residents in South Africa—were chased from
the township of Dunoon by a group of local men, Lloyd
Thomas, a Baptist minister and social activist in Cape
Town, remarked, “We’ve always thought ourselves special
and apart, and now Africa has invaded our lives. I sup-
pose a backlash like the one in Dunoon was inevitable,
wasn’t it? We will probably be seeing more of them.”
The rise in xenophobic feelings among those, both
black and white, that are now defined as South Africans
can also be understood as analogous to the way in which
the process of globalization has harbingered the prolif-
eration of ethnic conflicts throughout the world. While
many predicted that the process of globalization would
result in the demise of ethnic differences, as local com-
munities increasingly came into contact with one an-
other, the reality has proven quite different.
Globalization, instead of causing cultural difference to
become obsolete, has, in fact, increased its significance.
For it is only in opposition to an “other” that cultural dif-
ference becomes relevant and can be used by political
leaders to construct concepts of ethnicity. As Turton ex-
plains, “Globalization is a precondition of localization . . .
One cannot ‘think’ locally unless one already has an idea
of a global context in which localities can co-exist.”
In a similar sense, the merging of racial identities into
a single unified concept of nation in South Africa has
necessarily resulted in increased attention being focused
at the local level on who qualifies as South African and
who does not. Whereas foreign-born Africans were once
accepted and granted legal status within the Bantustans
during apartheid, they are now targeted as “illegals” in the
new South Africa. Just as globalization highlights the dis-
similarities between local communities, the process of
South African nation building has drawn attention at the
local level to the cultural differences that exist between native
and foreign-born people within South Africa.
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Conclusion
As the gap between the new government’s efforts, in re-
cent years, to restructure the South African state “consti-
tutionally” and “culturally” continues to widen, the
prevalence of xenophobia amongst South Africans has
risen dramatically. On the one hand, the South African
state, through its adoption of numerous international in-
struments, has exhibited its commitment to the principle
of universal human rights enshrined in the documents.
The values espoused, including the thirty rights granted
to all persons as opposed to only citizens, in the 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights represent a visionary attempt
to separate South Africa from the legacy of apartheid and
establish it as a liberal democratic state.
On the other hand, in order to claim legitimacy, the
new South African state must be seen as representing the
South African nation. The “natural” coupling of identity
and rights, embodied in the concept of national citizen-
ship, which has defined states since the time of the French
Revolution, describes the relationship between the nation
and the state as follows: “The principle of sovereignty re-
sides essentially in the Nation: no body of men, no indi-
vidual, can exercise authority that does not emanate
expressly from it.” In attempting to separate itself from
the apartheid state that preceded it, the post-apartheid
government has sought to redefine the South African na-
tion non-racially. What once could be referred to as an
“imperialist state” has now begun the transition to a
“state-nation” model, predicated on the reconstruction of
South African identity. The dissolution of the Bantustan
system and its concomitant emphasis on internal borders
has led to an increased awareness of and attention paid to
the control of South Africa’s external borders.
The process of nation building within South Africa,
however, has not proven inclusive for all those residing in
its borders. The state’s new sense of nation has developed
not only in opposition to those whom it tries to prevent
from entering South Africa, but also in opposition to the
large numbers of foreign-born people within South Af-
rica whom it, by definition, has sought to exclude from
national citizenship. While foreign-born people in South
Africa are granted numerous rights on paper, in reality
they are often denied their most basic rights due to the
xenophobic attitudes of state officials and ordinary citi-
zens alike.
The disparity in South Africa between the “constitu-
tional” and “cultural” reform strategies is not unusual. As
the process of globalization occurs and the culture and
language of human rights becomes more prevalent, the
traditional concept of national citizenship, understood as
the union of identity and rights within a bounded terri-
tory, is being challenged. Soysal contends that, in the
post-war era, “Rights that were once associated with be-
longing in a national community have become increas-
ingly abstract, and defined and legitimated at the
transnational level. Identities, in contrast, are still per-
ceived as particularized and territorially bounded.” In
other words, as the culture of universal human rights is
increasingly adopted throughout the world, the role of
the state as the guarantor of rights is being limited.
“While nation states and their boundaries are reified
through the assertions of border controls and appeals to
nationhood, a new mode of membership, anchored in the
universalistic rights of personhood, transgresses the na-
tional order of things.” In South Africa, “constitutional”
reform has progressed in accord with the global culture
of human rights, but “cultural” reform, expressed as na-
tion building and the reconstruction of identity, has re-
sulted in the limitation of rights to certain persons both
inside and outside South Africa’s borders.
Viewed in its historical context, it is possible to under-
stand the intrinsic, yet tumultuous, role that migrants of
all types have played in constructing South African iden-
tity since the country’s creation. As the fledgling democ-
racy struggles to claim legitimacy as the expression of the
South African nation, the history of immigration and
identity formation in South Africa continues to affect the
country.
While President Mbeki refers to South Africa’s partici-
pation in an “African Renaissance,” the increasing levels
of xenophobia within South Africa, due to the rift be-
tween the processes of “constitutional” and “cultural” en-
gineering, thwart his efforts to foster solidarity with the
rest of the African continent. This does not mean, how-
ever, that South Africa is necessarily doomed to regress
into a state defined by its xenophobia and at peace with
neither itself nor the world. South Africa has a long his-
tory as the economic force in Southern Africa and could
potentially, acting in what Dolan refers to as its “enlight-
ened self interest,” help to lessen its attractiveness to for-
eigners by investing constructively in neighbouring
countries. As host to the  World Conference on Rac-
ism, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance this summer,
South Africa will gain legitimacy as a liberal democratic
state and a contracting party to the universality of human
rights. In order to actually achieve its objective of elimi-
nating xenophobia and racial discrimination, however,
the South African government must recognize that there
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exists an inherent contradiction between its desire to
combat xenophobia and the fact that its success in build-
ing a South African nation hinges on its ability to con-
struct its own identity in opposition to people from other
African countries.
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